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Abstract
Third party punishment can be evolutionarily stable if there is heterogeneity in the cost of punishment or if punishers
receive a reputational benefit from their actions. A dominant position might allow some individuals to punish at a lower
cost than others and by doing so access these reputational benefits. Three vignette-based studies measured participants’
judgements of a third party punisher in comparison to those exhibiting other aggressive/dominant behaviours (Study 1),
when there was variation in the success of punishment (Study 2), and variation in the status of the punisher and the type of
punishment used (Study 3). Third party punishers were judged to be more likeable than (but equally dominant as) those
who engaged in other types of dominant behaviour (Study 1), were judged to be equally likeable and dominant whether
their intervention succeeded or failed (Study 2), and participants believed that only a dominant punisher could intervene
successfully (regardless of whether punishment was violent or non-violent) and that subordinate punishers would face a
higher risk of retaliation (Study 3). The results suggest that dominance can dramatically reduce the cost of punishment, and
that while individuals can gain a great deal of reputational benefit from engaging in third party punishment, these benefits
are only open to dominant individuals. Taking the status of punishers into account may therefore help explain the evolution
of third party punishment.
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Introduction
Third party punishment has been consistently shown to be one
of the main factors that ensures cooperation within groups of
individuals [1]. Third party punishment is effective at promoting
cooperation even if it is delayed [2] or given in a verbal form only
[3], and the mere presence of a third party significantly increases
both fair behaviour and, conversely, the unwillingness to accept
unfair behaviour [4]. Third party punishment has also been
claimed to be a universal human behaviour [5]. Nevertheless,
there is continuing debate as to how third party punishment could
initially evolve, because it imposes costs on an individual while the
benefits are shared amongst the group as a whole [6]. In this
paper, we consider two, not mutually exclusive, solutions to this
problem: that individual’s gain indirect benefits from punishment,
and that certain individuals can punish at reduced cost.
1.1 Reputation and third party punishment
The problem of the cost individuals pay for punishment can
potentially be overcome if there was some way for punishers to
recover the costs of punishment through indirect benefits from
their actions. Specifically, through earning a positive reputation
[7,8]. Third party punishers are seen as trustworthy, group focused
and ‘nice’ [9,10] and these positive social attitudes translate into
actual rewards. It has been suggested that engaging in third party
punishment can act as a costly signal of an individual’s altruistic
nature [10] and, indeed, those who punish are often also highly
cooperative [11]. Interestingly, the positive traits associated with
punishment are also those we demand in leaders [12], and with
this in mind the results of Gu¨rerk et al. [13], that individuals prefer
an environment where punishment is possible, could be reinter-
preted to suggest individuals prefer to be in an environment where
someone will punish social defection. A reputation as a punisher
might therefore allow the punisher to recruit social allies or
cooperative partners more easily because, as well as signalling their
own altruistic and cooperative tendencies, it may suggest they will
intervene to ensure any individual in their vicinity is treated fairly.
Alternatively, engaging in punishment might be less about
signalling pro-social personal characteristics and more about
signalling dominance and personal formidability. Third party
punishment, if not an aggressive act per se, can certainly be
considered a confrontational one as at some point it must involve
an individual attempting to inflict a cost upon a defector or
aggressor, and most confrontational actions are instigated by
dominant individuals [14–16]. Humans can easily identify the
victor in a confrontation [17] and recognising one’s place in a
PLOS ONE | www.plosone.org 1 October 2014 | Volume 9 | Issue 10 | e110045
dominance hierarchy is a vital part of the social cognition of any
group-living animal [18]. Accordingly, engaging in punishment
would certainly suggest a dominant position. Indeed, the examples
of punishment that occur in the non-human literature are carried
out by dominant individuals only [19–21], with the apparent
purpose of maintaining their social rank.
Benard [22] showed that aggressive behaviour does act as a
deterrence against confrontational behaviour, and it has been
suggested that ‘cooperative’ behaviour could be a result of
coercion by a more powerful receiving party [23]. In fact,
Marlowe et al [24] suggested that one reason for the lack of third
party punishment in small scale human societies is that, due to
eavesdropping on dyadic interactions, a ‘don’t mess with me’
reputation can be easily established without an individual
involving themselves in the conflicts of others. Thus third party
punishment could be another form of aggression used as a signal of
social position and to demonstrate personal formidability, i.e.
‘don’t mess with the enforcer’ [9], with any rewards from the
behaviour [10] being due to fear. Nevertheless, the reputation
gained from an act of third party punishment need not only be
either as trustworthy person or as a formidable person; it could be
both. For example, research on welfare trade-off ratios, the process
by which we make resource allocation decisions [16], splits the
factors in this process into two broad categories: the potential
benefit the recipient provides to us, and their ability to inflict costs
upon us. Thus an act of punishment could provide duel social
gains to a punisher because, on the one hand, they are seen as
beneficial to be around as their actions indicate they are
trustworthy and are willing to defend group norms and eliminate
free-riders, and on the other hand they have signalled their
individual formidability or willingness to use force and thus should
be treated fairly or even with deference.
However even if there are benefits are available in the long-term
from engaging in punishment, the immediate costs of punishment
(see below) still present a barrier of entry for this behaviour
[25,26]. While reputational gain may offset the cost of punishment
indirectly, this will only occur if the punisher survives the attempt
at punishment itself. But if there is heterogeneity in the cost of
punishment, the behaviour can emerge even without reputation
being a factor [27,28], and then be further stabilised by the
subsequent reputational gain. We believe such heterogeneity can
be represented by position in a dominance hierarchy, and that a
dominant position not only lowers the immediate cost of
punishment, but in doing so allows dominant individuals-only to
access the indirect/reputational benefits of third party punish-
ment.
Dominance itself can be difficult to define [29], here we use the
term loosely to cover a range of concepts such as formidability,
status, prestige and power; i.e. simply as a label for an individual
who has a strong position is a social hierarchy, or who is
recognised as having ‘‘priority of access to resources’’ [18]. While
there are likely to be nuanced differences between types of status,
we believe that the benefits of a ‘strong social position’ as described
in the current article would be comparable whether this position
was achieved through, for example, aggression or prestige [30].
1.2 Dominance and the cost of punishment
Why would differences in dominance translate into heteroge-
neity in the cost of punishment? Firstly, dominant individuals have
access to a greater amount of resources [18]. For example, their
position gives them greater opportunities for reciprocity and
cooperation [31] and their prominence means that others are both
willing to tolerate asymmetries in reciprocity and to provide aid in
conflicts in order to maintain a close relationship with the
dominant individual [32,33]. Dominant individuals also demand
that their needs are met above others [16], can behave coercively
in dyadic relationships to ensure this [34], and are less likely to face
punishment for behaving unfairly [4,35]. Because of their higher
total resources, a given act of punishment costs a dominant
individual a smaller fraction of their resources,
Secondly, dominance may reduce the cost of punishment by
making it more effective, i.e. by making the cost it inflicts on the
punished individuals higher. Effectiveness of punishment is
important to its evolutionary stability [27], and only effective
punishment has been shown to deter free-riding [25]. However,
while this finding is consistent across the experimental third party
punishment literature, so far little has been said as to how this
would manifest outside of the laboratory, i.e. what would allow an
individual to punish effectively? Dominant individuals, we argue,
can punish more effectively, insomuch as they can inflict a greater
cost on the target either physically [16] or by using their social
position to limit access to resources or information [36].
Furthermore, perhaps the most important cost to third party
punishment is retaliation from the target [37]. Where retaliation to
punishment is possible, third party punishment is reduced to the
point that it no longer sustains cooperation or is evolutionarily
stable [37,38] and, in everyday life, the threat of retaliation is a
prime factor in preventing otherwise cost-free punishment
behaviour such as reporting criminal activity [39]. Dominant
individuals are, self-evidently, successful in dyadic conflicts and, as
previously stated, in essence third party punishment is a dyadic
interaction between the third party and the defector/norm-
violator. Therefore dominant individuals may be able to engage in
third party punishment without the risk of reprisals as the target
will simply acquiesce to their demands. Indeed, when third party
punishment does occur outside the laboratory it is carried out by
formidable individuals [40] or by those with the support of allies
[41] - circumstances where the threat of retaliation would be
reduced. In fact retaliation could be a conventional cost to
punishment that may make it a costly signal of either formidability
or a pro-social attitude, as even if the production cost of
punishment is cheap; for example punishment by condemnation
[3], by gossip [42], or by ostracism [43], the retaliatory cost may
be severe for anyone in a subordinate position.
Finally, as dominant individuals can punish more effectively and
face less risk from retaliation, it may be possible for them to lower
the cost of third party punishment still further, potentially to
effectively zero, by establishing a credible threat of punishment
[44]. Once a reputation for third party punishment has been
established, an individual may never, or at least rarely, need to
actually engage in punishment for the foreseeable future.
1.3 The current studies
From the literature introduced in 1.1 and 1.2 it can be said that
while there might be reputational benefits, both for a pro-social
nature and from signalling dominance, from engaging in third
party punishment, perhaps these benefits can only be accessed by
individuals who can overcome the initial costs of punishment;
dominant individuals. To investigate this, using a series of vignettes
the current article measured social judgments made by uninvolved
observers about individuals who engage in third party punishment
and what factors affected these judgements. Specifically, we
investigated whether dominance judgements are in fact made
about third party punishers, and whether judgements of domi-
nance and likability (i.e. ‘pro-social’ attitude about a punisher)
were unique to third party punishment or were similar across
other antagonistic encounters (Study 1); whether observer
judgments of a third party are sensitive to the potential immediate
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costs of the behaviour (Study 2); and whether a dominant position
is recognised as lowering the cost, and raising the likely success, of
third party punishment (Study 3).
The majority of work in this area has been conducted using
economic games. However the vignette method, as well as being
used consistently in social psychology, has also been used to study
other phenomena related to human evolution, for example
altruism [45], mate choice [46] and formidability [47]. For
research on norm violations and a general discussion on the use of
vignettes, see [48]
1.4 Ethics statement
These studies were conducted in accordance with Ethical
Guidelines and with full ethical approval of the University of
Exeter Departmental Ethics committee. Participants gave in-
formed written consent before taking part in the studies being
presented and were fully debriefed once the studies had been
completed. The data set for these studies can be accessed from
http://hdl.handle.net/10871/15639.
Study 1
This exploratory study investigated whether observers judge
individuals who engage in third party punishment differently to
those who engage in other types of aggressive behaviour, i.e.,
whether any judgements of dominance or reputational benefits are
related to the act itself or, more generally, to an effect of
aggression/winning a physical contest.
2.1 Method
2.1.1 Participants. 414 (132 male) undergraduate students
from the University of Exeter, UK, successfully completed the
survey. Participants were recruited via email using an existing
‘paid participant’ list. As an incentive to take part, any participant
who completed the survey was entered into a prize-draw for a
number of store vouchers worth £10 (about US 13). The mean
age of participants was 22 years. 25 participants failed manipu-
lation check questions and their data was excluded from all
analyses
2.1.2 Materials and procedure. The survey was adminis-
tered online. Participants followed an email link which randomly
assigned participants to a condition which presented them with a
survey consisting of two sections. They were first presented with
the experimental vignette, described and presented as a ‘news
website-style article’. It was not made explicit whether this article
was real or fake. To keep with the ‘news site’ aesthetic and the
wider aims of the study, the article included a picture of its subject,
a male identified only as ‘John Taylor’. This picture was chosen
from a set of photos collected for a previous study [49] as the face
received neutral ratings in regards to attractiveness and trustwor-
thiness. Once participants had finished reading the article they
were presented the second section of the survey which contained a
series of questions concerning John.
2.1.3 Experimental Scenario. Participants were presented
with one of four possible articles concerning the actions of John. In
the Third Party punishment condition, John was described as
having successfully intervened to stop the mugging of an old man
late at night; in the Second Party punishment condition, John was
described as having successfully fought off a mugger late at night;
in the Random Fight condition, John was described as having
been involved in a bar fight of indeterminate cause; and in the
Control condition John was described as having witnessed a flash-
mob. In all three experimental conditions the assailant who fought
John was described as ‘‘a 6ft muscular male’’. For the full scenario,
see File S1.
2.1.4 Social questions. Participants were asked a series of
questions regarding how likable John was. They were asked to rate
John on a scale of 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree) as to
how trustworthy, group focused and ‘nice’ he was, and whether
they would work and socialise with him. These questions were
adapted from Barclay [9] and in the current study the five items
had a high reliability index (a=0.91). Therefore they were
collapsed into a single ‘likability’ variable for all future analyses.
Male Participants then answered a further set of questions
concerning how dominant they perceived the third party to be by
rating him, on a scale of 1–7 (1 = strongly disagree, 7 = strongly
agree), on how threatening, intimidating, dominant, antagonistic
or aggressive he was. These questions were adapted from Buss [50]
and were also found to have a high reliability index (a=0.86) and
were therefore collapsed into a single ‘dominance’ variable for all
future analyses.
As part of the wider aims of the study, female participants
(n = 282) were asked questions concerning their willingness to be
romantically involved with John (these data are not reported here).
In order to keep the questionnaires to a similar length for both
sexes, females were not asked to judge John for perceived
dominance (see below).
2.2. Results
2.2.1 Likeability. As shown in Figure 1, John was seen as
more likable when he was depicted as engaging in third party
punishment than in the other conditions (F3,407=37.46, p,0.001;
note that three cases were dropped from this analysis as
participants had not completed all the ‘likability’ measures). John
in the Random Fight condition was the least liked. Bonferroni-
corrected pair comparisons found significant differences (all p,
0.001) between all pairs of Article-types except between the
Control and Second Party conditions (p = 1.0). The sex of the
participant did not affect overall judgements or interact with the
type of scenario presented to participants.
2.2.2 Social Dominance. John was judged as more domi-
nant in all the experimental conditions compared to the Control
condition (Third Party, M=3.42, SD=1.10; Second Party,
M=3.34, SD=1.01, Random Fight, M=3.55, SD=1.05,
Figure 1. Participant’s judgement of John’s likeability depend-
ing on the type of behaviour he was reported having engaged
in. Bars = 1 Standard Error.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0110045.g001
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Control, M=2.57, SD=0.94; F3,128=5.78, p=0.001). Bonfer-
roni-corrected pair comparisons found significant differences
between the Control Article and the experimental conditions
(Random Fight, p = 0.002; Second Party Punishment, p = 0.008;
Third Party Punishment, p= 0.01), but no differences in
judgments of dominance between the three experimental condi-
tions (all p = 1.0).
2.3. Discussion
These results show that the increase in likability of third party
punishers cannot be explained alone by them winning an
altercation or by the ‘warm glow’ that may accompany seeing
an offender receive retribution [51,52]. When John fought off his
own attacker, he was seen as no more likable than in the control
article where John did nothing. This is likely because second party
punishment is driven by a desire to protect oneself, or for personal
retribution and to save face [53]. Thus defending yourself says
little about your qualities save your ability to fight back. That John
was seen as most likable when engaging in third party punishment
adds further evidence to the suggestion that the behaviour can
signal specific additional information about the altruistic and
trustworthy nature of a punisher [10]. Indeed, while there can be
sex differences in how violence is perceived [54], both males and
females made similar judgements about the likability of John.
Judgements about dominance were however dependent solely
on the aggression in the encounter rather than on the context, i.e.,
John was seen as equally dominant whether he intervened as a
third party or was involved in a fight with an indeterminate cause.
This is unsurprising as engaging in aggressive behaviour is a signal
of dominance [15] and perceiving dominance from an interaction
can be seen as a reasonably objective process; it is in our interests
to make accurate observations of a social hierarchy [18] and the
outcome of a confrontation can be easily recognised [17]. It should
be remembered that the dominance data came from male
participants only, however for the aforementioned reasons, i.e.
that it is in all individuals interest to accurately assess dominance,
and because it has been shown that both males and females agree
on male formidability [55], it is unlikely that dominance
judgments would be affected by sex.
By comparing the judgements of a third party punisher to other
aggressive acts, this study demonstrated that engaging in third
party punishment alone provided the punisher with positive
reputational benefits. This study also demonstrated, in males at
least, that engaging in third party punishment can make one seem
more dominant without the negative social consequences associ-
ated with other forms of aggressive behaviour.
Study 2
Study 1 found that third party punishers are judged to be more
likable than individuals who engage in other aggressive behav-
iours, yet were judged to no less dominant than individuals who
engage in other aggressive acts. Study 2 also investigated what
information observers are using to judge third party punishers,
specifically whether judgements are affected by the success of the
intervention and whether the level of threat an aggressor posed
would further affect a participant’s perceptions of the punisher.
Study 2 also investigated whether these factors affected the
perceived dominance rank of the aggressor/defector, the victim
and the third party relative to one another, i.e., if punishment can
signal a dominant position in a group.
3.1 Method
3.1.1 Participants and materials. 102 psychology under-
graduate psychology students from the University of Exeter (85
females) successfully completed the study, with an additional 12
participants either failing the manipulation checks or dropping out
of the study before completion. Participants were recruited via
email from the 1st year psychology cohort (2011). As an incentive
to take part, any participant who completed the survey was
entered into a prize draw for a number of online-store vouchers
worth £10 (about 13 US). The mean age of participants was 21.
The study employed a between-subjects design with 3 experimen-
tal conditions and one control condition; participants followed an
email link which randomly presented with one of four experi-
mental vignettes, followed by a series of questions concerning the
third party punisher in these vignettes.
3.1.2 Experimental Scenario. Participants were asked to
imagine themselves seated alone in a local bar and told that they
observed a group of men enter and occupy a table nearby.
Participants were then told they observed an altercation between
group members in which one member (the ‘aggressor’) forced
another (the ‘victim’) to relinquish his seat so the aggressor could
sit down. These labels are for clarity only; in the scenario itself the
characters were identified by the colour of the shirts they were
described as wearing.
In condition 1, the ‘successful’ condition, a third group member
(the ‘third party’) successfully intervened and forced the aggressor
to give back the seat. In condition 2, the ‘unsuccessful’ condition,
the third party intervened but failed to force the aggressor to give
back the seat. In condition 3, the ‘increased threat’ condition,
participants were told they observed a successful act of punish-
ment, but in this scenario the male characters were unknown to
one another and not part of a self-contained group. Thus, because
the third party did not have prior social knowledge of the
aggressor, and because the latter could have ‘targeted’ the
participant/observer, the aggressor was a greater potential threat
in this scenario. This increased threat condition matched the
successful condition in all other respects. In condition 4, the
‘control/no action’ condition, participants were told they observed
the interaction as in Condition 1 & 2, but here the third party
became agitated but did not intervene. For the full scenario, see
File S1.
3.1.3 Social Questions. Participants were then asked to
make a series of social judgements about the third party in the
scenario. Firstly, participants were asked to rank the three
characters in the story in terms of dominance (1 being most
dominant and 3 being least dominant). All participants were then
asked the five likability questions (a=0.88 for this study) and the
five social dominance questions (a=0.85 for this study) as
described in Study 1. As in Study 1 these items were collapsed
into single ‘likability’ and ‘dominance’ variables for all future
analyses.
3.2 Results
The study tested two distinct hypotheses: that there would be a
relationship between how participants responded to a third party
depending on their level of intervention (successful vs. unsuccessful
vs. control; N= 82), and that there would be a difference in
participant responses between the level of threat posed by the
aggressor (successful vs. increased threat; N= 59). Data relating to
these hypotheses were analysed separately.
3.2.1 Third Party behaviour and relative dominance
rank. Participants ranked the third party to be most dominant
when he successfully intervened, with fewer ranking him as most
dominant when the intervention failed, and the fewest when he did
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not intervene. The victim was nearly always ranked as least
dominant (Figure 2). To investigate the relative difference between
the characters, we considered which character was ranked as the
most dominant by participants. The success of punishment
affected whether the third party was seen as the most dominant
individuals (x22=28.75, p,0.001): In the successful condition, the
third party was more likely to be ranked as most dominant (78%),
compared to the third party who unsuccessfully (22%) or failed to
(19%) intervene.
3.2.2 Third Party behaviour and judgements of
dominance. Figure 3 shows that the third party was judged to
be more dominant when he attempted to intervene, regardless of
whether or not he was successful, than when he did not interviene
(F2,79=7.16, p,0.001, Contrast analysis: successful vs. unsuccess-
ful, F1,80 = 1.65, p=0.20; successful vs. no action, F1, 80 = 14.30,
p,0.001; unsuccessful vs. no action, F1, 80 = 4.06, p=0.047).
3.2.3 Third Party behaviour and judgements of
likability. Figure 3 also shows that the third party was judged
to be more likeable when he attempted to intervene, regardless of
whether or not he was successful, than when he did not intervene
(F2,80=4.72, p=0.009; Contrast analysis: Successful vs. Unsuc-
cessful, F1,81=0.15, p=0.70; Successful vs. No Action,
F1,81=7.27, p=0.009; Unsuccessful vs. No Action, F1,81=6.40,
p=0.01).
3.2.4 The threat posed by the attacker and judgements of
the third party. The third party was judged to be more
dominant when the threat posed by the aggressor was increased
(M=4.56, SD=1.11) compared to the successful condition
(M=3.95, SD=1.02; F1,58 = 4.56, p=0.037). However, the level
of threat did not affect how likable the third party was judged to be
(increased threat, M=4.80, SD=1.21; successful, M=4.70,
SD=1.09; F1,58=0.11, p=0.75).
3.3 Discussion
Here, the results concerning the judgements of dominance are
unequivocal; successful intervention by the third party led
participants to perceive him as most dominant, and unsuccessful
intervention led to the aggressor being perceived as most
dominant. While this result is no surprise, to the authors’
knowledge it is the first study to demonstrate that engaging in
third party punishment directly affects the perceptions of an
uninvolved observer with respect to the punisher in this manner.
What is surprising is that when asked to make social judgements
about the third party, participants judged him to be more likeable
and dominant when he intervened, regardless of the success of the
intervention. While it has been demonstrated that there are
reputational gains from engaging in third party punishment [9,10],
in these studies, as was the case in the vignette for Study 1, by
design punishment was always successful. That perceived like-
ability and dominance remained even when the interaction was
unsuccessful suggests that such ratings are not due to a halo effect
of seeing an antisocial individual punished [51,52] or due to the
punisher being the recipient of indirect or strong reciprocity for
carrying out a public function.
The results do however add further evidence to the suggestion
that third party punishment can be seen as a costly signal of
dominance. Due to the threat of retaliation [38,56], the mere act
of punishment should provide an honest signal, as retaliatory costs
will likely be present whether the intervention was successful or not
(see Study 3). This is further highlighted by the higher dominance
Figure 2. Proportion of participants who, across conditions, ranked the third party, the aggressor and the victim as the most
dominant character (black bars), gave the character the middle rank (grey bars) or ranked them as the least dominant character
(white bars).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0110045.g002
Figure 3. Judgement of likeability and dominance of the third
party depending on whether the third party successfully
intervened (black), unsuccessfully intervened (grey) or failed
to intervene (white). Bars = 1 Standard Error.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0110045.g003
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rating given to the punisher in the Increased Threat condition; the
lack of any social information or social support from fellow group
members made the risks even higher and thus the signal more
reliable.
However, there was no corresponding increase in likability in
the higher threat condition. Nelissen [10] suggested that increased
signal reliability should increase the positive attitude to the
punisher and the lack of an effect here may suggest there is an
upper limit to the positive attitude engaging in punishment
generates: the motivations of punishers might be questionable
[9,57] and, in this study at least, punishment was aggressive and
aggressive individuals are generally disliked [58].
Study 3
Both Study 1 and 2 found that third party punishment increased
an individual’s likability and perceived dominance and these are
both benefits that could allow a punisher to recuperate the cost of
punishment. Punishment can also be evolutionarily stable if the
cost of punishment is low [27], and this can be achieved if a threat
of punishment is credible [59] or through less aggressive
punishment such as ostracism [43]. Study 3 therefore addressed
whether the status of a third party punisher affected the perception
of their ability to make the threat of punishment credible, whether
it affected the risk of retaliation they faced, and whether the type of
intervention affected how punishers are judged. Study 3 also
addressed how these factors affected any reputational gains
generated from an act of punishment.
Also in response to the results of Study 2, the scenario was
altered (see below) to lower the ‘risk’ to participants from the
aggressor: participants were described as being within the group
and the targets for aggression were out-group members. These
changes also allowed the information regarding status to be
integrated into the vignette more subtly.
4.1 Method
4.1.1 Participants & Materials. 108 psychology undergrad-
uate students from the University of Exeter (86 females) completed
the study in 2013. Participants were not offered any incentive for
taking part. The survey was administered in paper-form by a
single researcher who approached potential participants in and
around the Psychology building. Those who agreed to take part
were presented with a paper questionnaire containing one of four
experimental vignettes and a series of questions concerning the
Third Party punisher in the scenarios. Prior to the questionnaire
being given to the researcher, the order of administration was
randomised using the random-number generator feature of Excel.
4.1.2 Experimental Scenarios. Participants were asked to
imagine themselves as part of a local sports team, who, following
an evening practice session, had retired to a local bar. The team
had occupied a table but there were not enough seats for everyone
so some members, including the participant, had to stand. Nearby,
two strangers were sitting at another table and after a few minutes
one of them headed to the bar to order drinks. Seeing this, one of
the standing members of the team went over to the table and
proceeded to take the now vacant chair, dismissing the objections
of the still seated stranger. Upon their return with the chair,
another member of the team confronted this person about their
actions.
The study manipulated the status of the confronting team
member – the third party – and how they carried out their
confrontation (Punishment Type). They were described as either
‘‘popular and the most skilled player’’ (dominant) or ‘‘unpopular
and the least skilled player’’ (subordinate), and they either
threatened to hit the other team member (physical punishment)
or threatened to prevent them playing in all future matches (social
punishment), giving the study a 262 between-subjects design.
‘Dominance’ in a social group, especially human groups, does
not depend solely on formidability [60], and we have used it to
describe a person recognised as having a strong social position, or
as ‘‘having priority access to resources’’ [18]. Therefore for Study
3, we operationalised dominance to mean a skilled/prestigious
position. This allowed us to manipulate the type of punishment, as
a prestigious individual can potentially punish effectively by using
social, as opposed to physical, power. For the full scenario, see File
S1.
4.1.3 Social perception questions. Following the scenario,
participants were first asked a series of questions designed to
investigate how credible the threats from the third party were.
Participants were asked to indicate ‘what happened next’ from one
of two choices; either the punishment was successful with the team
member returning the chair, or unsuccessful and the team
member kept the chair. They were also asked to indicate on a
scale of 1–7 (1 = not surprised, 7 = very surprised), how surprised
they were that the specific individual in the scenario intervened
and, on a scale of 1–7 (1 = very unlikely, 7 = very likely), whether
they believed the reprimanded individual would retaliate against
the punisher. All participants were then asked the five likability
questions (a=0.82 for this study) and the five social dominance
questions (a=0.85 for this study) as detailed in Study 1.
4.2 Results
4.2.1 Credible threat of punishment. Participants were
first asked whether they believed the aggressor would ignore or
give in to the Third Party’s demands. Participants believed that the
intervention by the dominant punisher would be more successful
(Wald x21 = 147.53, p,0.001), with the dominant third party
predicted to be successful by 94% of participants, whereas the
subordinate was predicted to be successful by 22%. Participants
did not believe that the type of punishment alone would alter the
outcome (Wald x21 = 0.51, p = 0.48). Figure 4 shows that while
participants believed the dominant punisher would be successful
regardless of punishment type, the subordinate punisher was
thought to be successful only when being physically aggressive
(Wald x22 = 9.80, p=0.002).
As shown in Figure 5, participants were far more surprised
when a subordinate third party attempted punishment compared
to the dominant third party (F1,104=128.16, p,0.001) and
believed retaliation from this intervention was more likely to follow
(F1,104=6.70, p = 0.011). Neither variable was affected by the type
of punishment, or by an interaction between dominance and
punishment.
4.2.2 Dominance and Likability. The dominant third party
was, as may be expected, judged to be more dominant (dominant,
M=5.5, SD=1.1; subordinate, M=3.6, SD=1.2;
F1,104=111.76, p=0.001) but there was no effect of dominance
on how likable they were judged to be (F1,104=0.48, p=0.49). As
shown in Figure 6, when the third party engaged in aggressive
punishment they were seen as less likable (F1,104=6.84, p=0.01):
however, being more aggressive did not lead the punisher to be
judged as more dominant (F1,104=2.07, p=0.10). No interaction
was found between either Status and Punishment for likability
(F1,104=0.83, p=0.77) or social dominance (F1,104=0.43,
p=0.51).
4.2.3 Success, likeability and retaliation. Given the
results regarding the insensitivity of participants to the success of
punishment found in Study 2, a post-hoc analysis was carried out
to see if there was any relationship between predicted success and
Reputation, Dominance, and the Evolution of Third Party Punishment
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likability; none was found (U=1308.5, N1= 59, N2= 48, p=0.5).
However, there was a relationship between predicted success and
retaliation, with participants believing unsuccessful punishers to be
at greater risk from retaliation (M=4.79, SD=1.56) than
successful punishers (M=3.73, SD=1.50; U=856.5, N1= 59,
N2= 48, p,0.001).
4.3 Discussion
These results clearly suggest that dominance can drastically
lower the cost of punishment. Firstly, particpants believed that
only dominant third parties would be successful in their
intervention. Thus, for dominant individuals, the realised costs
of third party punishment can be effectively reduced or even
removed completely by replacing physical action with a credible
threat of punishment. Importantly, the credible threat imposed by
the dominant third party was not based on the type of punishment
employed; they were seen as equally likely to be successful whether
the threat was aggressive (threat of physical violence) or non-
aggressive (ostracism from the group). In fact ostracism has
previously been shown to facilitate group cooperation without
coordinated punishment and at no cost to the punisher [43]. Such
a threat therefore can be seen as highly credible, but only if it
comes from a dominant individual
Equally, this study found that dominant individuals were judged
to be at less risk of retaliation than subordinates. Study 2
established that individuals who attempt third party punishment
are seen as more dominant, yet participants in Study 3 were both
surprised at the intervention by the subordinate individual and
believed they would be at greater risk from retaliation. Even
dominant individuals were judged to be at some risk and it may be
the case that at least some risk of retaliation is required for any
punishment to be a costly signal: while their threats may be
credible, a dominant individual would need to prove on occasion
they can actually enforce such threats. Indeed, while potentially
Figure 4. Proportion of participants who believed that a) dominant or b) subordinate punisher would be successful (grey) or
unsuccessful (white) in their attempt at punishment.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0110045.g004
Figure 5. Participants’ reaction to the intervention for a
dominant (white) or subordinate (grey) Third Party. Bars = 1
Standard Error.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0110045.g005
Figure 6. Participants’ perception a third party’s likability and
dominance when they engaged in aggressive (white) or non-
aggressive (grey) punishment. Bars = 1 Standard Error.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0110045.g006
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third party punishment may be important in signalling one’s
dominant position, participants felt that a subordinate individual
attempting to assert themselves in this way would be unsuccessful.
In both human and non-human animals false-signalling is often
responded to severely [61–63] and in the current study partici-
pants believed that attempted punishment by a subordinate would
lead to a greater risk of retaliation.
The study also suggested that the social benefits generated by
engaging in punishment are significantly affected by dominance,
specifically the ability to successfully use non-violent punishment.
Participants disliked third parties who threatened physical violence
in general and only the dominant punisher was perceived as being
successful when non-violent punishment was threatened. Domi-
nant individuals can therefore punish in a more socially acceptable
way and as a result make greater reputational gains that
subordinates. Nevertheless, the dominant punisher in Study 3
was only able to punish so non-violently due to their authority in
the groups and this leverage may not always exist in ‘real life’.
However, while less liked, the violent stance by the dominant
punisher was also predicted to be successful. In comparison to the
results of Study 1, where third party punishers were more well-
liked in comparison to other violent behaviour, Study 3 suggests
that while any third party punishment is responded to positively by
observers, there is a preference for less violent intervention.
Study 2 and 3 found that success was no predictor of ‘likability’,
but while this does suggest that potentially both dominant and
subordinate individuals could gain a reputational benefit from
attempting punishment, participants also believed that failure in
punishment would invite retaliation; for subordinates, the retalia-
tory cost of failure would likely outweigh any benefits from the
attempt. Again, participants were very surprised at the interven-
tion by a subordinate punisher, so while the vignette ‘forced’ a
subordinate to punish, it is debatable whether in a real-life
situation a low status or subordinate individual would actually
engage in third party punishment.
General Discussion
The studies above investigated whether variation in dominance
within a group might allow third party punishment to be
evolutionary stable because a dominant position allows individuals
to access the reputational benefits from punish at a lower cost than
others. Study 1 demonstrated simply that, when compared to
other violent confrontations, third party punishment makes an
individual seem both formidable and likable, i.e., that it yields
reputational benefits for the punisher. Study 2 demonstrated that it
was the attempt at punishment and not its success that led to these
reputational gains. Finally, Study 3 demonstrated that dominant
individuals could punish ‘cost-free’: not only was any target of
punishment perceived as (very) likely to back down before physical
action could occur, but dominant individuals were also seen as
having a reduced risk of costs from retaliation and could punish in
a more socially acceptable way. Taken together, these studies
suggest that third party punishment is seen as a dominant act, that
any attempt at third party punishment yields reputational gain,
but, perhaps more importantly, the reputational benefits are only
open to dominant individuals. Only dominant individuals can
lower the production costs via the effective use of non-violent and
cost-free threats of punishment [27,43] and only dominant
individuals can punish with a reduced risk of retaliation. In fact,
the costs of retaliation especially may stretch beyond the initial act
of punishment. Humans are adept at reputation scoring [64], and
if punishers are ‘scored’ in a similar fashion as altruistic individuals
[65], then a reputation for enforcing fairness, while potentially
beneficial for attracting some cooperative partners, could act as an
reputational badge that may invite aggression from others [61],
akin to the sheriff in a Western or the eponymous protagonist of a
super-hero film; i.e., the person who needs to be ‘taken out’ to
allow the exploitation of others. In this instance a reputation for
enforcing fairness might work against a punisher, or at least one
who could not resist such future actions.
That only more dominant individuals are able to access the
reputational benefits of third party punishment moves beyond the
idea that punishment merely signals fairness [10]. Only dominant
individuals are capable of giving this signal credibly, meaning that
the reputational benefits from punishment are inextricably linked
to dominance. Specifically, while Study 2 did find that reputa-
tional benefits are ‘open to all’, Study 3 suggested that intervention
by a subordinate individual was both surprising and potentially
costly in terms of retaliation. Retaliation may be the key cost to
third party punishment [37,38] and, although we did not test this
directly in the current studies, in light of Study 3 it is questionable
whether a subordinate individual would ever actually engage in
third party punishment. The results of the studies suggest that
dominance/status is an important factor in any calculation of the
individual economics of punishment. Punishment can be evolu-
tionarily stable if there is heterogeneity in the ability to punish
[27,66] and we suggest that dominance causes sufficient hetero-
geneity in both the cost and rewards of third party punishment to
make this behaviour evolutionarily stable.
More theoretically, Pedersen et al. [67] recently suggested that
any account of the evolution of third party punishment in humans
must be relatable to behaviour seen in non-human animals. As
previously stated, third party punishment can be seen as an
antagonistic dyadic interaction between a third party and the
defector/aggressor and, across many species, such antagonistic
dyadic interaction are both instigated and won by dominant
individuals [14,15]. More directly in line with the assertion of
Pederson et al, in non-human animals, dominance determines
third party intervention across numerous taxa, for example in fish
queues [21], in fallow deer [68], and in Barbary macaques [69].
These interventions seem to be driven by the need to limit or
prevent the rise of a social challenger. Third party punishment can
therefore be seen as having an origin in recognising and
responding to social challenges [70], with only dominant
individuals possessing the ability to act upon this recognition.
This is important as, firstly, punishment as a tool to maintain social
position provides an additional motivation for an individual to
engage in the behaviour over and above any benefit from
maintaining group cooperation and, secondly, the benefits
punishment provides can be seen as independent from group-
level cooperation [56].
Although this suggestion is speculative, the demonstration that
dominance plays at least a proximate role in mitigating the costs of
third party punishment (at least according to the perception of
observers), and perhaps that it is partly motivated by status
concerns [36], does forge a link to non-human animal behaviour.
In much the same way that human reciprocity and cooperation
has a base in the more limited cooperative behaviour of other
animals [71], third party punishment in humans can be seen as a
more sophisticated version of a non-human animal behaviour
related to dominance and status contests, rather than one
completely distinct to us as a species.
The current studies investigated the perception of punishers
rather than punishment behaviour itself. The perceptions of others
are no doubt a consideration for punishers [72], as it is from
observers that indirect benefits are generated, we cannot be certain
from the present results that an individual in a dominant social
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PLOS ONE | www.plosone.org 8 October 2014 | Volume 9 | Issue 10 | e110045
position would actually engage in more punishment. However,
published data suggests that they will. For example we have
suggested that dominant individuals can punish more effectively
than others, and it a consistent finding that ‘effective’ punishers
(those who can inflict higher costs on defectors) will punish more
than ‘ineffective’ ones [73].
Future studies might extend our current results by designing
experimental mechanism to explicitly simulate the advantages of a
dominant position, for example by varying the cost of retaliation to
certain individuals or by providing certain individuals with an
unequal share of any group product [74]. It should be noted that,
while we have referred to ‘dominant’ individuals throughout, we
do not mean to suggest that only an ‘alpha male’ type would ever
punish, as different attributes will confer dominance in different
groups.
In our vignettes no economic costs were inflicted upon the
defectors in the scenarios. The costs were physical in Study 1
(aggressor described as being was physically assaulted), while in
Studies 2 & 3 there would still be costs via social humiliation due to
being publically shamed for, and forced to retract, an ‘unfair’
behaviour [75]. Such ‘non-monetary’ or ‘verbal’ punishment is
seen as third party punishment in the economic literature despite
the lack of direct economic costs [3,76].
In any case the imposition of actual costs is often an anticipated
downstream effect of the subsequent action taken by the target of
any punishment, rather than the immediate impact of punishment.
As an illustrative example, if an individual came across someone
smoking on public transport (illegal in the UK) and demanded
they stop, this would still be an act of third party punishment in the
classic Fehr (2004) sense (i.e. the desire and subsequent behaviour
to uphold a social norm) even if the smoker apologised and
snubbed out the cigarette with no further interaction taking place.
In such a situation there is only physical punishment if the
‘intervention’ is challenged. Indeed, Levine, Taylor, & Best [77]
showed that violence after the intervention by a third party only
occurs after a series of escalating behaviours by the parties
involved, each of which gives the opportunity for one party to back
down.
In fact, the possibility that punishment costs might not be
realised is a core argument as to how dominance affects the cost/
benefit of third party punishment: essentially, a position of
dominance, with its implied ability to inflict effective costs on
others, functions as a credible threat. Our smoker above would be
well aware of the potential costs (further social embarrassment
and/or a physical confrontation) and would thus choose to
acquiesce. We believe that people’s understanding of this
implication was demonstrated by Study 3, as when faced with a
challenge from a dominant individual, the transgressor was
predicted to back down rather than have cost of punishment
realised.
In conclusion, the current studies support the suggestion that
dominance played an important role in the evolution of third party
punishment. Punishment is seen as a dominant behaviour yet is
distinct from other dominant actions in the sense that punishers
are well liked, compared to other aggressors. Dominant individuals
were seen as being able to punish effectively and at a lower cost
than others, therefore dominant individuals can access the
signalling or reciprocal benefits generated by punishment at
reduced cost. We suggest that taking dominance into account may
help answer some of the questions and debates around the
evolution of this behaviour, specifically in terms of how some
individuals can overcome the costs of punishment. Variation in
individual condition can result in effective and efficient norm
enforcement [28], thus at the very least, our results demonstrate
that the dominance of the actor could be an important factor in
overcoming the proximate costs of third party punishment.
However we also believe that these results point to human third
party punishment behaviour having an evolutionary origin as a
dominance-based behaviour, rather than having evolved to
specifically promote cooperation and fairness.
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